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Nazi-looted art: a note in favour of clear standards and neutral procedures 
 
Evelien Campfens 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 7 November 2017 the French Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris ruled that the painting “Pea 
Harvest” by Camille Pissarro should be returned to the grandson of Jewish art collector Bauer who 
had lost his collection through confiscation by the Vichy government in 1943.1 The American couple 
that sent it on a short-term loan to a Paris museum had acquired it at Christie’s in New York in 1995, 
reportedly for $800,000.2 Their discontent with the outcome and intention to appeal the verdict was 
voiced as: “It surely is not up to [us] to compensate Jewish families for the crimes of the Holocaust”. 
The representative of the claimants on the other hand welcomed the verdict as ‘pure justice’: “I think 
the French court has applied the natural law.”  
 
On another level and some months earlier, in July 2017, the City of Munich informed the public that 
a ‘fair and just solution’ had been found regarding Paul Klee’s “Swamp Legend”, seized by the Nazis 
as ‘degenerate art’.3 It had changed hands several times when it was acquired for the Munich 
Lehnbachmuseum from a Swiss dealer in 1982. The press release informed the public that an 
undisclosed amount of money had been paid to the original owners to end decades of legal battle - 
after a German court had earlier found that the claim was inadmissible. A few months earlier 
litigation was initiated in the US over a painting by Kandinsky in the same museum – by other 
claimants - on allegations of it being Nazi-looted art.4 And, lastly, another recent example of a 
successful claim by private claimants relating to their wartime losses: in February 2017 the Dutch 
Restitutions Committee recommended the return of a family portrait by J.F.A. Tischbein that was 
looted during the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 (probably by the soviet army) to a Polish family.5  
                                                        
 Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University. General secretary Dutch 
Restitutions Committee (2002-2016). The author would like to thank Sergei Vasiliev, Prof. Nico 
Schrijver, Patricia Kennedy Grimstead and Weyer VerLoren van Themaat for their valuable 
comments. Also, the author is indebted to Roos Hoek for her research assistance. This paper is 
dedicated to Prof. Norman Palmer, QC. 
1 Case Bauer e.a. v. B. and R. Toll, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Jugement le 7 Novembre 
2017 (No. RG 17/587/35, no. 1/FF). NB Previously, 8 November1945, a Paris court had ruled the 
confiscation of the painting - from Simon Bauer - to be null and void, see ruling 7/11/2017, p. 4. 
2 A. Quinn, ‘French court orders return of Pissarro Looted by Vichy Government’, The New York 
Times, November 8, 2017.www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/arts/design/french-court-pissarro-looted-
nazis.html.  
3 Rathaus Landeshauptstadt München, Umschau 140 / 2017: Vergleich zur Beilegung der 
Auseinandersetzung im Falle des Gemäldes „Sumpflegende“ von Paul Klee, 26 July 2017 (Press Release 
Municipality of Munchen, see https://ru.muenchen.de); See also 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/arts/design/after-26-years-munich-settles-case-over-a-klee-
looted-by-nazis.html and  www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/kunstmarkt/restitution-paul-klee-
sumpflegende-bleibt-in-muenchen-15123237.html.  
4 R.C. Lewenstein e.a. v. Bayerische Landesbank, No. 17-cv-0160, U.S. NYSD, Complaint 3 March 
2017. 
5 Recommendation of the Dutch Restitutions Committee regarding Krasicki (RC 1.152) of 20 February 
2017. All recommendations available online: <http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/adviezen.html>; NB In 
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The increasing number and changing nature of such cases raise the question of whether clear 
international rules exist with regard to claims to Nazi-looted art.6 On the interstate level such rules 
exist: cultural objects have a protected status under international law and the obligation to return 
(restitute) cultural objects taken during armed conflict to the State it came from is well-accepted 
under international law.7 This paper will not deal with interstate rights and obligations but will focus 
on rights of private (non-Sate) parties to their wartime losses. 8 In 1998, these rights were addressed 
in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-confiscated Art. This non-binding declaration, 
signed by 44 governments, introduced the international rule that former owners (or their heirs) are 
entitled to a ‘fair and just solution’ with regard to Nazi-confiscated art that had not been restituted 
to them earlier.9 Whereas in 1998, however, the focus was primarily on claims by family members of 
Jewish Holocaust victims whose unclaimed confiscated artefacts were in Western museum 
collections, today the array of claims has grown much wider.10 Today, claimants are not necessarily 
relatives of Holocaust victims, and a confiscated work of art may surface in any public or private 
collection in the world. Nor are claims limited to art confiscated by the Nazis but may regard cultural 
objects taken by others than the Nazis as a result of the War, or art that was sold by refugees in a 
neutral country like Switzerland (so-called ‘Fluchtgut’, i.e. ‘escape-goods’). These developments are 
an indication that the ‘fair and just’ rule, developed to address the rights of private dispossessed 
former owners, is evolving. The question is, in what direction and by what logic?  
 
International practice today is also typified by a lack of transparency: often cases are settled – works 
are ‘cleared’ - in a confidential agreement without legal argumentation, as in the Munich case. 
However understandable in specific cases this hinders the development of a consistent, predictable 
and understandable set of norms, while openness would seem important given conflicting outcomes 
to similar cases.11 It is desirable for similar cases to be treated similarly and different cases 
differently, but in order for this to be so, one must agree on which relevant facts need to be similar. 
The soft-law norm (prescribing ‘fair and just’ solutions for ownership claims) is open and still unclear 
which means that there is a need for precedents – case law – to further develop that norm. The 
positive legal framework, on the other hand, is highly fragmented, and courts of law are often not 
able to assess claims on their merits. The expiration of post-war restitution laws, the non-
retroactivity of conventional norms, and various legal concepts such as limitation periods for claims, 
or adverse possession, are reasons for this.12 And although several Western European countries have 
                                                        
2005, the UK Spoliaton Panel also hounored a claim regarding a non-Nazi taking in its Report in respect of 
a 12th century manuscript now in the possession of the British Library of 23 March 2005.  
6 The term ‘Nazi-looted art’ can be used for various types of losses of cultural objects during the 
Second World War. This paper will focus, in line of case-law, on losses by persecuted owners in 
Western-Europe. See below, section 1.  
7 See below, section 1. 
8 Id. NB Obviously, the two legal frameworks are intertwined. 
9 ‘Washington Conference Principles on Nazi Confiscated Art’ (‘Washington Principles’) in J.D. 
Bindenagel (ed), Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets (State Department 1999) 971-97. 
Principle VIII. See: https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/270431.htm. 
10 Hereafter fn. 18 and accompanying text. 
11 See hereunder, section 1.3.1.3. 
12 For a general overview of obstacles to restitution: Beat Schönenberger ‘The Restitution of Cultural 
Assets’, (Eleven 2009), Chapter 4. On post-war restitution laws and non-retroactivity of conventional law: 
E. Campfens Sources of Inspiration: Old and New Rules for Looted Art, in: E. Campfens (ed.) 'Fair and Just 
Solutions? Alternatives to litigation in Nazi-looted art disputes: status quo and new developments (Eleven 
2015), p. 16-27. 
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installed special committees to advise on these claims, their mandate is limited.13 That leaves a 
second important question open: Who is to monitor compliance and explain the norm that 
individual owners have a right to a ‘fair and just’ solution regarding artefacts lost in the course of the 
Second World War, as propagated by the international community since 1998? 
 
This article makes a case for clear standards and transparent neutral procedures. In tribute to the 
late Professor Norman Palmer who voiced this idea in 2014, this paper concludes with a proposition 
of the establishment of a European claims procedure.14 The underlying thought is that a lack of 
clarity both at the level of substantive justice (what is the norm?) and at the procedural level (who 
will clarify that norm?), results in legal insecurity, inconsistent outcomes and, potentially, injustice. 
Moreover, while the number of cases is on the rise, the (European) soft-law model is challenged by a 
more legalistic approach in the US. The article is structured as follows:  
- The first part addresses the material norm and its rationale. It focuses on the question of 
what qualifies as unjustified wartime-taking and takes a closer look at the concept of a ‘forced sale’. 
What is at the heart of this concept and what are its limits? Does it extend, for example, to wartime 
sales in neutral countries (‘Fluchtgut’)?  
- The second part addresses access to justice. The 1998 Washington Principles, along with 
later soft-law instruments in the field, stress the importance of a non-legalistic approach and 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but what procedures are available? And how does new 
legislation and an increase of litigation in the US impact on the situation in Europe?  
- The last part of this paper proposes the establishment of a European claims procedure for 
difficult cases to enhance the development of common standards and provide better access to 
justice. 
 
 
1. Elements of substantive justice 
 
The ‘fair and just’ norm, introduced in 1998 in Washington, prescribes that “if the pre-war owners of 
art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted, or their 
heirs, can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution, 
recognizing this may vary according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case.” 15 
This is an abstract norm which has not been much clarified by the various later international 
declarations.16 In the Terezin Declaration of 2009, the most recent international declaration that was 
signed by 46 States, the ‘fair and just’ rule was rephrased as follows:  
 
“[W]e urge all stakeholders to ensure that their legal systems or alternative processes, while taking 
into account the different legal traditions, facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-
confiscated and looted art, and to make certain that claims to recover such are resolved 
expeditiously and based on the facts and the merits of the claims […].”17 
                                                        
13 In the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, France and Germany. See part 2. 
14 Prof. N. Palmer QC The best we can do? Exploring a collegiate approach to Holocaust-related claims in 
Campfens (2015), p. 153-187. 
15 Id., Principle VIII. 
16 An overview in Campfens (2015), p. 37. In short: Resolution 1205 On Looted Jewish Cultural Property by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 1999; the Vilnius Forum Declaration on Holocaust 
Era Looted Cultural Objects of 5 October 2000, signed by 38 governments (and Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Councel of Europe); The European Parliament Resolution and Report of 2003 (see section 2.2); and 
the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues of June 2009, 46 signatory States. 
17 Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues of June 2009: 
<http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/program/conference-proceedings/declarations/>, p. 4-5. 
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The focus in many of the soft-law declarations is on Holocaust-related losses (by Jewish owners).18 
The Terezin Declaration allows for a somewhat wider notion as it considers ‘Nazi-confiscated and 
looted art’ as the subject of the fair and just norm, and in the preamble addresses “victims of the 
Holocaust” as well as “other victims of Nazi-persecution by the Nazis, the Fascists and their 
collaborateurs”.19 Although the 2009 Draft UNESCO Declaration of Principles Relating to Cultural 
Objects Displaced in Connection with the Second World War was never adopted, it takes an 
interesting and more inclusive (neutral) approach, aiming at cultural object that were lost under 
“circumstances deemed offensive to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience”.20 
 
At issue in the following section is the question of what makes a specific loss of an artefact during 
the Nazi-era qualify for special and preferential treatment – transcending regular standards for 
stolen property – under the ‘fair and just’ rule? That discussion will focus on claims by private former 
owners (i.e. non-State actors).  
 
1.1 The ‘fair and just’ rule 
 
The relevant soft-law rule thus prescribes that for Nazi-confiscated or looted art a just and fair 
solution should be reached on the merits of the case (the ‘facts and circumstances surrounding a 
specific case’). That the rule was created specifically for art supports the view that its rationale 
should be found in the intangible heritage quality of art; the ability of cultural objects to symbolise a 
history of injustice and a lost family life is a reason for such items to be given special treatment, even 
where many years have passed and the acquired rights of current possessors present an obstacle. 
Another element of the rule is that it is aimed at a ‘fair and just solution’ implicating that it is not per 
se about the return of full ownership rights (restitution in the status quo ante). International practice 
over the years confirms that rights of former owners as well as rights of (innocent) new possessors 
are being acknowledged.21 A third element is that such a ‘fair and just’ outcome depends on the 
merits of a case, the ‘specific circumstances’. What, however, are those circumstances? 
 
The following is a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that are of importance in determining the 
outcome of present-day restitution cases:22 
 The identification of the artefact as property of the claimant’s predecessor in right at the 
time of looting (the original title);  
 The circumstances of the loss by ‘Nazi-looting’ (specific circumstances like confiscation or 
forced sale; general circumstances like time and place); 
 Previous post-war compensations and settlements; 
 The extent to which the owner made efforts to recover the work over time; 
 The circumstances in which the present possessor acquired the work and the provenance 
research carried out prior to acquiring it;  
 The specific interest of the parties in the artefact (the intangible heritage interest or 
monetary value); 
 The interest of the general public (public order). 
                                                        
18 In the Washington Principles: ‘Pre-war owners of art confiscated by the Nazis or their heirs’; 
‘Looted Jewish Property’ in Resolution 1205 of 1999, repeated in the Vilnius Forum Declaration; the 
Terezin Declaration has a focus on Holocaust victims. See hereafter, fn. 110 and text 2.2. 
19 Terezin Declaration, p. 4 (supra fn. 17). 
20 UNESCO Draft UNESCO Declaration of Principles Relating to Cultural Objects Displaced in 
Connection with the Second World War (35 C/24 of 31 July 2009), principle II. See also para 2.2. 
21 See the numerous financial settlements arranged for with the help of auction houses. 
22 This list is based on research of cases and personal experience), and open for discussion.  
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Discussion of this full list exceeds the scope of this article. The first two elements – identification as 
former property and loss through looting – could, however, be classified as being basic requirements 
for the admissibility of a claim.23 If a specific work of art can be (i) identified as former property (at 
the moment of loss) and (ii) was lost through Nazi-looting, a claim can be considered (a right exists 
under the soft law norm); if not, no claim exists under the soft law norm. Whereas identification of a 
work is a matter of factual provenance research and interpretation of that research, the second 
element is a matter of legal definition: when can a loss be defined as ‘Nazi looting’ in the sense of 
the soft-law norm in the Washington Principles? A discussion of this question follows after a brief 
discussion of the legal setting. 
 
1.2 The legal setting 
 
Cultural objects have a protected status under international law and both the destruction of 
monuments and looting24 of cultural objects is prohibited. This prohibition was codified in the 1907 
Hague Convention.25 The obligation to return artefacts looted in spite of this prohibition is a settled 
norm of customary international law as well.26 It can be invoked on the interstate level. The 
existence of these rules, as history teaches us, does not prevent looting from happening.  
 
That the Nazis looted works of art on a vast and systematic scale is well known and, arguably, lies at 
the base of a special treatment. Nazi policy differed from country to country but one of the 
objectives was to obtain as much ‘desirable’ art as possible to underline the hegemony of the Third 
Reich. The ways of acquiring artefacts included (i) plunder of private collections in the context of 
racial policies and persecution, from own citizens (and institutions) and in occupied territories; (ii) 
pillage of public art collections in occupied territories, mostly in Eastern European countries, and (iii) 
acquisition of artefacts on the art market in Western countries.27  
 
It is the first category – plunder of private property – that seems to underlie the (soft law) norm that 
urges stakeholders to find fair and just solutions as defined in the Washington Principles (also: the 
‘fair and just rule’). This means that although another notion of unlawful Nazi looting exists – and in 
fact all transfers of artefacts from occupied territories were prohibited under international law and 
                                                        
23 And arguably the third element: a prohibition of expropriation applies if no proper compensation was 
paid (Art. 1 First Protocol European Convention of Human Rights). 
24 The terms ‘looting’ and ‘pillage’ are used in the cultural heritage field to define misappropriation 
of cultural goods in the event of a national or international armed conflict, see Dictionnaire comparé 
du droit du patrimoine culturel, ed. M. Cornu, J. Fromageau, C. Wallaert, Paris, CNRS. Editions 
(2012)). In this article the term ‘looting’ is used to include takings in a situation beyond the an ‘armed 
conflict’ such as confiscation as a result of racist legislation in Nazi Germany. For this, the UNESCO 
definition of takings “offensive to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience” 
seems useful (see fn. 20). 
25 Convention concerning the Laws and Custom of War on land, Convention IV, The Hague, ad. 18 
October 1907. 205 CTS 277. Art. 46, 47 and 56. 
26 E.g. A. Chechi, The Settlement of International Cultural Heritage Disputes (OUP 2014). 
Problematic in this regard is that some states (e.g. Russia) argue that ‘restitution in kind’ is allowed 
as well; i.e. as reparations for the wide-scale Nazi-looting and destruction of cultural objects in 
Russia by the Nazis artefacts found in the Russian zone of Germany in the post-war period were 
taken (and are kept) as war-booty. 
27 See for a description of the methods in the proceedings of the trial agains A. Rosenberg Trial of the 
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol 22 (International Military Tribunal 1948) 
540. Cited in J.H. Merryman and A. Elsen Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, (Kluwer 1998), p. 31.  
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the Inter-Allied Declaration28-, this should not be confused with 'Nazi-looting' as addressed in the 
fair and just rule. The latter norm aims to create rights – albeit of a non-binding nature – for 
individual victims of looting or their heirs to their lost artefacts; it does not seek to create (more) 
rights for nation states in the way they already exist under traditional international law or the post-
war system. In this sense the fair and just norm, aiming at rights of individual victims, can be 
classified as a matter of international human rights law.29 To complicate matters, these two sorts of 
norms in place for Nazi-looted art (for States and individual former owners) may create coinciding 
rights/obligations to same objects; for example with regard to art held in Russian or Polish museums 
that may have been confiscated in occupied territories and taken to those countries as ‘war booty’ in 
the post-war period.30 This issue will not be discussed in this paper. 
 
- Post-war redress 
 
The post-war system of the Inter-Allied Declaration provided for interstate restitution and 
cooperation to reverse all kinds of Nazi-looting, also of artefacts taken from public collections or 
that were sold in voluntary transactions. It relied on location of looted cultural objects and their 
return to the country from where it had (last) been transferred, and restitution to individual owners 
who had lost their artefacts as a result of confiscation or forced sales on a local level.31 However, the 
enthusiasm of these earlier restitution efforts was short-lived and many works found their way into 
collections all over the world before they could ever be returned.32 The various national restitution 
laws enabling individual owners to claim their property after the War, soon expired. Moreover, in the 
1950s the signatory states to the Settlement Convention seem to have made a choice to ‘clear’ 
looted artefacts in the hands of third parties by introducing a general sunset clause for restitution 
claims, set at 1956.33 Dispossessed owners were, under that post-war system, eligible for 
                                                        
28 Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation 
and Control (5 January 1943): a warning that the Allies “reserved their rights to annul transfers or dealings 
which took the form of open looting or plunder as well as seemingly good faith transactions”, as 
confirmed in the UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, 1944; see Resolution VI, 939-
943 and Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparations; with annex. Paris, 21st December, 1945. 
Furthermore, cultural objects have a protected status and pillage from occupied territories is prohibited 
by customary international law, see Art. 46, 47 and 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, 205 CTS 277.  
29 As post-war Allied internal restitution Laws for Germany. Vrdoljak, A.F. 'Gross Violations of Human 
Rights and Restitution: Learning from Holocaust Claims', in Realising Cultural Heritage Law: Festschrift for 
Patrick O'Keefe (Crickadarn: Institute of Art and Law, 2013), Pages 163-187. 
30 For examples see P. Kennedy Grimstead “Nazi-looted Art from East and West in East Prussia: 
Initial Findings on the Erich Koch Collection”, IJCP vol. 22 (2015), nr. 1, p. 7-61. Problematic is that 
Poland nor Russia implemented the Washington Principles. 
31 Principles were laid down in the Interallied Declaration (supra fn. 28); the Agreement between the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France in respect of the  
Control of Looted Articles, 8 July 1946 (1951, 25 Department of State Bulletin 340, 15); and in the 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation signed at Bonn, May 
26, 1952, as amended by Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, signed at Paris, October 23, 1954; in force May 5, 1955. (1955). American Journal of International 
Law, 49(S3), 69-83. (‘Settlement Convention’) Chapter 5, Art. 1 and 2. 
32 L.V. Prott, ‘Responding to WWII Art Looting’, in The Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(ed.), The Permanent Court of Arbitration/Peace Palace Papers: Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes 
(Kluwer Law International 2004), 114. And Campfens (2015), p. 15-26. 
33 “[..] any person who, or whose predecessor in title, during the occupation of a territory, has been 
dispossessed of his property by larceny or by duress (with or without violence) by the forces or 
authorities of Germany or its Allies, or their individual members (whether or not pursuant to orders), shall 
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compensation by the German State if their cultural object could not be located for which owners or 
heirs should file claims (as in other countries compensation schemes were introduced).34 
 
- fair and just rule: causal link between persecution and loss 
 
In 1998, upon the recognition by the wider public that many artefacts confiscated from owners 
persecuted by the Nazis were never returned, the fair and just rule was introduced. It relates to 
losses of artefacts that are the result of, or closely linked to, persecution. This includes 'confiscation' 
in the narrow sense – seizure based on racial legislation – but also forced sales (sales under duress).35 
In other words, losses with a direct causal relation to persecution. This notion should also serve to 
define the limits of the rule: a loss that is not directly related to persecution is not covered by the fair 
and just rule.  
 
The close causal link between persecution, loss of possession and a right to reparation was included 
in the first article of US Law 59, the post-war restitution law for the US Zone of Allied-occupied 
Germany.36 Its purpose was “to effect to the largest extent possible the speedy restitution of 
property that was lost by wrongful deprivation within the period from 30 January 1933 to 8 May 1945 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, ideology or political opposition to National Socialism”.37 
Losses in other (occupied) territories would fall under similar (special restitution) legislation enacted 
in the respective countries, and typically would declare ab initio void those confiscations or seizures 
resulting from racial laws and make forced sales voidable (upon a claim).38  
 
Intermediate conclusion 
 
A conclusion at this point is that the fair and just rule creates certain (non-binding) rights for 
individual former owners to their lost cultural objects notwithstanding obstacles under positive 
(property) law. As such, its legal setting is in the field of international human rights law (as opposed 
to traditional international law) and it can be seen as an evolving right of individual former owners 
(or groups of people) to their lost cultural objects.39 The intangible heritage quality of art – as a 
symbol for past injustices or a family history - on the one hand, and a causal relation between 
persecution and the loss of a work of art on the other, are at the core of the preferential treatment 
of such claims 
 
A more controversial issue, which will be the focus in the remainder of this section, is how direct and 
proximate the causal link with persecution should be. Obviously thefts, confiscations and seizures by 
Nazi organisations – resulting from the so-called ‘Mobel-Aktion’ or seizures by Einsatzstab 
                                                        
have a claim against the present possessor of such property for its restitution. [..] No such claim shall exist 
if the present possessor has possessed the property bona fide for ten years or until 8 May 1956, whichever is 
later.” Settlement Convention (fn. 31), Chapter 5, Art. 3 (1). 
34 Ibid., Chapter 5, Art. 4. And a loss by the hands of the Vichy Government in France would be 
compensated by the French government. 
35 And already accepted in the Interallied Declaration, supra fn. 28. 
36 ‘Law No. 59 of the Military Government in Germany, US Zone: Restitution of Identifiable Property’, art. 
1, in: United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Court of Restitution Appeals 
Reports (United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany 1951) 499-536. 
37 Ibid. art. .1 
38 In that sense, the confiscation in 1943 in the French Bauer case was void (see introduction, fn. 1). On 
post-war restitution laws: Campfens (2015), p. 21-26.  
39 E. Campfens “Whose cultural heritage? Crimean treasures at the crossroads of politics, law and 
ethics”, AAL, Vol. XXII, issue 3, p. 205-206. 
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Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) - qualify, as do the so-called Judenauktionen (‘Jewish auctions’ set in 
stage by the Nazi’s). 40 In short, all transfers directly based on certain racial legislation under Nazi 
rule.41 But what are the limits to the notion of ‘Nazi-looted art’, and what exactly is a forced sale? 
This section will deal hereafter with forced sales. 
 
1.3 Forced sales 
 
Forced sales or ‘sales under duress’ qualify as Nazi-confiscation under the fair and just rule. At one 
end of the spectrum lies the typical ‘gun-to-the-head’ situation: a Jewish owner being forced to sell 
their artefacts to Nazi authorities under threat of reprisals. Similar would be a loss in the absence of 
the owner (i.e. without the will or initiative on the part of the owner), because they had been forced 
into hiding or were able to make it away in time. Sales in order to keep oneself alive while in hiding 
for undervalue would also qualify, like the sale ‘for an apple and an egg’ by the Jewish owner in 
hiding in occupied Belgium of their Griffier painting as dealt with in the first report of the UK 
Spoliation Panel.42 Not always, though, circumstances are so clear. Difficult categories without clear 
standards include ‘early sales’, sales by art dealers and so-called ‘Fluchtgut’ sales; these will be 
discussed below. 
 
Under post-war restitution laws, decisive elements in determining whether a sale should be 
classified as forced or not included: 43 
 a fair purchase price (or conversely: disparity between value and selling price) and free 
availability of the proceeds; 
 the time of the loss of possession (before or after the racial laws of 1935 in Germany, with 
different periods applying to each country depending on when they were under Nazi 
control);  
 own initiative; and 
 the nature of the acquiring party (was it a Nazi-official?). 
These elements resurface in present-day recommendations by the respective European panels and 
in US case law.44 In view of the fact that the losses occurred a long time ago and that facts are not 
                                                        
40 E.g. the various Gentili di Giuseppe cases, a.o. in France (Chistiane Gentili di Giuseppe et al. v. Musée du 
Louvre, Court of Appeal of Paris, 1st Division, Section A, 2 June 1999, No. 1998/19209) and the US. See for 
the forfeiture action in the US of a work from the same collection on loan from Italy: Platform ArThemis, 
Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva (hereafter: Arthemis) https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-
affaires/christ-carrying-the-cross-dragged-by-a-rascal-2013-united-states-v-painting. 
41 In this sense, e.g. Dutch Recommendation of 11 April 2011 (RC 1.114-B) regarding a sculpture from Fritz 
Gutmann’s collection confiscated by the ERR in Paris; The 1996 US Gutmann case, (Goodman v. Searle, 
Complaint, No. 96-6459 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996) concerned a Degas painting that was part of the same 
group of artefacts confiscated by the EER in Paris. Litigation ended by a settlement (see Arthemis: 
https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affaires/landscape-with-smokestacks-2013-friedrich-gutmann-
heirs-and-daniel-searle). Another example is the Altmann case, litigated in the US and settled by 
arbitration (Republic of Austria v. Altmann, No. 124 S. Ct 2240, US Sup Ct, 7 June 2004).  
42 Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in Respect of a Painting now in the Possession of the Tate Gallery 
of 18 January, 2001. All reports of the SAP available online: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/spoliation-advisory-panel#panel-reports. 
43 N. Robinson 'War Damage Compensation and Restitution in Foreign Countries' (1954) in 16 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 347-376; E. Campfens “Sources of Inspiration: old and new rules for Looted Art”, 
in Campfens (2015), p. 21-26. 
44 With ‘European Panels’ are meant special Committees tasked with the adjudication of Nazi-looted art 
claims, discussed in section 2.1. In the German situation focus is on a ‘fair market price’ (see the 
Draft AAL (Dec. 2017), vs. 19 November 2017 
 9 
always clear, in today's cases value is also attached to declarations and actions (or a lack thereof) by 
former owners or their heirs. Statements and post-war documents can validate (or invalidate) claims 
by the owners that a sale was considered forced. In this sense, for example, the Dutch Restitutions 
Committee considered the lack of action in the post-war period a circumstance of importance in its 
2012 Recommendation regarding the loss of two statues under unclear circumstances at an 
unknown moment after 1934 in Berlin:  
 
“If the exchange had been involuntary, it would have been obvious for Max von 
Goldschmidt-Rothschild’s private secretary […] to have mentioned this in his letter of 6 July 
1946 (writing about the artefacts at stake, EC). He did not do so, however. It would also be 
logical that if the exchange had been involuntary in nature, the Von Goldschmidt-Rothschild 
family would have submitted an application for restitution of or compensation for the 
sculptures after the War, as they did for the works of art that were sold in 1938 under the 
pressure of the Nazi authorities.” 45 
 
1.3.1.1  Early Sales 
 
An ‘early sale’ can be defined as a sale that occurred before racial laws were (fully) in force. Because 
such laws were often introduced gradually the general conditions used to justify an assumption that 
a sale by an owner that was targeted by such laws was a forced sale (under duress), vary from 
country to country. Allied restitution laws for Germany for example made a distinction between a 
sale before or after the Nuremberg Race Laws of September 1935, and this resurfaces in present-day 
German decisions today. Similarly one can distinguish between periods of (increasingly) threatening 
general conditions for example in the Netherlands or France.  
 
A preliminary observation based on ongoing research into the category of 'early sales' is that there is 
no clear line amongst the European panels. US courts seem to have predominantly dismissed such 
cases on the basis of 'technical defences' (i.e. statute of limitations or a lack of jurisdiction)46, or 
cases were settled before they were decided upon.47 Conflicting outcomes in the various claims 
relating to the Glaser collection in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and the US may serve to 
illustrate this.  
 
                                                        
‘Guidelines’ (annex V b), under 3); Litigated cases focus, in the US and elsewhere, on technical legal 
issues like statutes of limitation, jurisdictional matters and conflict of law issues. 
45 Recommendation regarding Von Goldschmidt-Rothschild (RC 1.110) of 6 December 2012. Other 
examples: e.g. the US Glaser litigation: In re Ellen Ash Peters, as Executrix for the Estate of Maria Ash v. 
Sotheby’s Inc., 2006 N.Y. Slip Op 6480 [34 AD3d 29].  
46 See for example Schoeps et. al. v. Freistaat Bayern, No. 14-2739, Summary Order, US Courts of Appeals 
2d Cir., 22 May 2015: the claim based on a loss by the sale of a Picasso by Mendelssohn-Bartholdy in 1934 
was dismissed on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over German property. This, as opposed to rulings where 
confiscation in the narrow sense was at stake and jurisdiction was accepted, for example in the Altmann 
case dealing with Austrian museum property (Republic of Austria v. Altmann, No. 124 S. Ct 2240, US Sup 
Ct, 7 June 2004). 
47 E.g. Schoeps et al. v. The Museum of Modern Art; and The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation (No. 
07 Civ. 11074 JSR, Memorandum Order, U.S. Dist. C.D. New York, S.D., 23 March 2009) on what 
seems an early loss of two Picasso paintings (unclear facts). The case was settled on the eve of the 
trial. Interestingly, judge Rakoff explicitly voiced his discontent with the confidentiality of the 
settlement as being: “against public interest”. 
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In its 2009 Report in Respect of Eight Drawings now in the Possession of the Samuel Courtauld 
Trust, the UK Spoliation Panel denied the claim of the Glaser heirs. 48 Curt Glaser, a prominent 
Jewish art historian, lost his job and house almost immediately after Hitler came to power in January 
1933 and auctioned his art collection in May 1933 in Berlin to start a new life abroad. The Panel 
considered that, although Nazi persecution was the main reason for the sale, Glaser had obtained 
reasonable market prices (“reflecting the general market in such objects and [the prices were] not 
depressed by circumstances attributable to the Nazi regime”). Besides, it argued, his widow was 
awarded compensation under an agreed and conclusive settlement with the awarding authorities. 
The Panel denied the claim but recommended that The Courtauld display alongside the drawings an 
account of their history and provenance during and since the Nazi era.  
 
Both in the Netherlands and in Germany, however, claims relating to Glaser works sold at the same 
auction –meaning they were lost under exactly the same circumstances – were honoured. The Dutch 
recommendation relied on the view that the loss was involuntary as a direct result of the Nazi 
regime, and on the consideration that proceeds shall not to be taken into account if these were 
‘used in an attempt to leave the country or go into hiding’ according to Dutch restitution policy 
rules.49 In Germany several other claims by the Glaser heirs were successful, resulting in financial 
settlements.50  
 
A New York court had previously denied a claim by the Glaser heirs in the US in 2006 on a painting 
by Munch, sold by Kurt Glaser’s brother after Glaser himself had left the country. In line with the UK 
Panel’s decision the court relied on a contemporaneous letter of Glaser himself: "If Professor Glaser 
did not treat the painting as stolen in 1936, his wife's estate will not be heard to speculate, some 70 
years after the fact, that it might have been misappropriated and that its acquisition at auction (..) 
was therefore tainted."51 
 
1.3.1.2  Business transactions by art dealers 
 
Artefacts often concern personal possession with emotional or spiritual value, valued for their 
beauty and handed down through generations.52 Sales by art dealers often miss this intangible 
aspect and therefore can be considered a special category. The objects are commodities and a sale, 
normally, would have the nature of a business transaction by a legal entity. In other words, the 
special personal, spiritual or cultural-historical interest in the artefact is not a given. If one takes such 
intangible (heritage) value of the artefact as a basic element of the fair and just rule - as is proposed 
in this article -, sales by art dealers stand out. Another difference is that the objective of an art dealer 
is to buy and sell artefacts and, hence, the involuntary nature of a sale (at an early date) cannot 
automatically be assumed.  
                                                        
48 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Report in Respect of Eight Drawings now in the Possession of the Samuel 
Courtauld Trust, 24 June 2009. 
49 Recommendation regarding Glaser of 4 October 2010 (RC 1.99); all recommendations on: 
http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/recommendations. 
50 E.g. the settlement with the Stiftung Preusssischer Kulturbesitz, that must be seen, in the words of 
SPK’s chairman H. Parzinger against a special background: “In acknowledgment of Prof. Glaser’s 
presecution by the Nazi Regime and in honour of his great achievements for the museums in Berlin”. 
Speech 27 November 2015 https://www.preussischer-
kulturbesitz.de/en/services/search.html?q=restitution+glaser&x=39&y=3&id=610&L=1. 
51 In re Ellen Ash Peters, as Executrix for the Estate of Maria Ash v. Sotheby’s Inc., 2006 N.Y. Slip Op 6480 
[34 AD3d 29], p. 6. 
52 See also the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference): 
http://art.claimscon.org/home-new/looted-art-cultural-property-initiative/.  
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The Dutch Restitutions Committee has dealt with a number of cases concerning works of art sold by 
Jewish art dealers. The background to this is that the art market in the Netherlands flourished 
during the Nazi occupation after years of depression. Although dealing with the Germans was 
prohibited53, this did not prevent art from being dealt on a wide scale by Dutch dealers, at the early 
stages of the occupation by both Jewish and non-Jewish. 54 In light of this, the present-day Dutch 
restitution policy makes a distinction between private owners and art dealers with the following 
rationale: “That the art trade’s objective is to sell the trading stock so that the majority of the 
transactions even at the Jewish art dealers’ in principle constituted ordinary sales”.55 Whereas 
private sales by Jewish owners during the Nazi rule benefit from the assumption of a forced sale, the 
same is not true for art dealers. On these ground claims by the heirs of the Jewish art dealers Katz 
regarding sold objects were, for example, denied56. This does not mean all sales by Jewish art 
dealers are considered voluntary by the Dutch Restitutions Committee.57 This is demonstrated by its 
two recommendations concerning the Mogrobi art dealership: a first claim, regarding 13 artefacts, 
was honoured as it concerned sales from 1942 onwards while the owner was in hiding (RC 1.37), but 
a later claim that concerned sales in the early years of the Nazi occupation was rejected (RC 1.145).58 
The latter rejection on the grounds that: 
 
(a) The purchaser of the currently claimed items was a museum director who later became 
involved in the resistance during the War. The earlier recommendation concerned German 
buyers, primarily German museums. 
(b) The dates on which the currently claimed items were sold were 1 February 1941 and a day 
in March 1942. The sales involved in the earlier recommendation took place in 1942 and in 
1943.59 
 
In the Van Lier Case (RC 1.87) regarding artefacts sold by the Jewish art dealer Van Lier the Dutch 
Committee rejected all but one claim, on an ivory horn. The grounds were that this particular object 
had a special value for the family since Van Lier is depicted blowing this horn in a portrait of from 
around 1930. In the words of the Commitee “this photograph provides a salient image of their 
forefather and of an art object that was of unique value to him, thus giving the object an emotional 
value to the family.”60 Here, the intangible heritage value of artefacts for specific people is being 
addressed. 
 
                                                        
53 The prohibition was enacted by Law A6 adopted by the Dutch government in exile (Koninklijk Besluit 
A6 ‘Besluit Rechtsverkeer in Oorlogstijd’ of 7 June 1940). 
54 F. Kunert and A. Marck, ‘The Dutch Art Market 1930–1945 and Dutch Restitution Policy Regarding Art 
Dealers’ in Eva Blimlinger and Monika Mayer (eds.), Kunst sammeln, Kunst handeln: Beiträge des 
Internationalen Symposiums in Wien (Böhlau Verlag 2012); E. Muller and H. Schretlen, Betwist Bezit 
(Waanders Uitgevers 2002) 25-30. 
55 Ekkart Committee’s Recommendations regarding the Art Trade 
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25839-34.html>. 
56 Restitutions Committee Recommendation regarding Katz (RC 1.90) of 1 July 2009. The case is 
complicated by the fact that the dealership acted as an intermediate in sales, i.e. they did not necessarily 
own the artefacts. 
57 E.g. the Dutch Stern case (RC 3.195) concerning a sale in Germany after 1935.  
58 Recommendations regarding Kunsthandel Mozes Mogrobi (RC  1.137) of 12 February 2007, and (RC 1.145) 
of 20 July 2015. 
59 Id. (RC 1.145). 
60 Recommendation concerning Van Lier, (RC 1.87) of 6 April 2009. 
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The German Beratende Kommission has dealt with art dealer cases, for example, in its two 
Flechtheim cases. These concerned the art collection of the prominent Jewish Berlin dealer in 
modern (“degenerate”) art. In its recommendation in 2013 restitution of a painting sold in 1934 in 
Germany was granted on the grounds that: “The loss of ownership was directly connected to the 
closing of the Galerie Alfred Flechtheim in Düsseldorf which was forced by the political 
circumstances." 61 That not all losses by Flechtheim were under the same circumstances may be 
illustrated by other Flechtheim cases in Germany and the US.62 
 
Another case dealt with by the Beratende Kommission concerns the sale in 1935 of the so-called 
“Welfenschatz” (“Guelph Treasure”) to the Dresdner Bank by a consortium of Jewish art dealers. In 
its recommendation, the Commission held that the sale in 1935 cannot be seen as a forced sale:  
 
According to the findings of the commission, the art dealers had been trying to resell the 
Welfenschatz since its acquisition in 1929. Although the commission is aware of the difficult 
fate of the art dealers and of their persecution during the Nazi period, there is no indication 
in the case under consideration by the Advisory Commission that points to the art dealers 
and their business partners having been pressured during negotiations […]. Furthermore, 
the effects of the world economic crisis were still being felt in 1934/1935. […] Moreover, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the art dealers and their business partners were not free 
to dispose of the proceeds.63 
 
After this rejection in Germany the Welfenschatz case was brought before the a US court.64  
Another well-known art dealer case concerns the trading stock of Jacques Goudstikker, a prominent 
Dutch (Jewish) art dealer who escaped Amsterdam on the arrival of the Nazis, leaving over 1000 
works of art behind. These fell prey to German art lovers like Alois Miedl as well as to Nazi chief 
Hermann Goering. 65 After the War many works returned to the Netherlands – leading to the return 
of 202 paintings in 2005 by the Dutch government66-, however many did not return and, hence, may 
surface anywhere. In the US, the Von Saher v. Norton Simon Art Foundation case, concerning two 
                                                        
61 Recommendation of the Advisory Commission on the return of cultural property seized as a result of Nazi 
persecution; Press Release of 9 April 2013; see: < https://www.kulturgutverluste.de>, para 4. 
62 Recommendation of the Beratende Kommission in the matter of the Heirs of Alfred Flechtheim v. 
Stiftung Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf of 21 March 2016 < 
https://www.kulturgutverluste.de>. This claim was denied, see hereafter, fn. 78. In the US, a 
Flechtheim case concerning paintings in possession of a Munich museum is pending since December 
2016. In that case the Museum argues that the works were sold before Hitler came to power (Michael 
R. Hulton and Penny R. Hulton v. Bayerische Gemäldesammlungen, No. 16-CV-9360, U.S. NYSD). 
63 Recommendation of 20 March 2014 of the Beratende Kommission regarding the 'Welfenschatz', see < 
https://www.kulturgutverluste.de>.  
64 Philipp et al. v. Federal Republic of Germany et al. No. 1:15-CV-00266, Complaint, U.S. Dist. (C.D. 
Columbia, 23 February 2015). See below section 2.4. 
65 That the sale was ‘forced’ seems beyond doubt. The Dutch Restitutions Committee in its 
Recommendation regarding the application by the Amsterdamse Negotiatie Compagnie NV in Liquidation of 
19 December 2005 (RC 1.15), as well as US courts considered the sale as forced. Eg. the 2016 US ruling 
(Marei von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, et. al., Case 2:07-cv-02866-JFW, District 
Court Central District of Cal., August 9, 2016), p 2: "In July 1940, after the Goudstikkers escaped, Nazi 
Reichsmarschall Herman Göring, and his cohort, Aloïs Miedl, acquired the Firm’s assets through two 
involuntary “forced sales”.”; A complication in this case is that in the post-war period a settlement 
agreement was signed with the widow of Jacques Goudstikker, Desi Goudstikker, see RC 1.15. 
66 Recommendation regarding the application by the Amsterdamse Negotiatie Compagnie NV in Liquidation 
of 19 December 2005 (RC 1.15). 
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works by Cranach that were part of the trading stock of Goudstikker, is now in its tenth year of 
litigation.67 The specific ‘art-dealership element’ surfaces in the circumstance Goudstikker bought 
the Cranach paintings at a 1931 Berlin auction of artefacts that were confiscated by the Soviet 
government from the aristocracy and others. As stated in the 2016 US ruling: 
 
“On or about May 11, 1931, Jacques, on the Firm’s behalf, purchased the Cranachs from the Soviet 
Union at the Lepke auction house in Berlin. Although the auction was entitled the “Stroganoff 
Collection” and featured artworks that the Soviet Union had forcibly seized from the Stroganoff 
family, it also included other artworks, such as the Cranachs, that were never owned by the 
Stroganoff family but rather that were seized from churches and other institutions.”68 
 
This provenance was well-known at the time and the auction evoked protest.69 It appears that the 
Cranach paintings were seized in Ukraine in the 1920s.70 Many bought artefacts at this auction and 
Goudstikker, being a business man, bought the objects with a view to selling them with profit. In US 
(and French) courts such soviet seizures of artefacts have been challenged, but these claims have 
been ‘off limits’ on the basis of the Act of State doctrine (unlike Nazi confiscations, see part 3).71 
Nevertheless, in the context of the fair and just norm the question whose interests in such cases 
should have priority can be raised: a museum that bought the paintings in the 1970s on the regular 
art market; heirs of the shareholder of the art dealership that acquired confiscated works in 1931 and 
lost them as the result of the Nazi-regime in 1940; or perhaps even an unknown third party in 
Ukraine that lost the works as the result of confiscation in the early 1920s?  
 
1.3.1.3  Sales in neutral countries ('Fluchtgut') 
 
Sales in neutral countries during the Nazi-era are at the far end of the spectrum of what some 
consider a ‘forced sale’, bringing them within the realm of the notion of ‘Nazi-looting’.72 These could 
be sales in Switzerland by Jewish owners on their way to freedom, or sales that took place in other 
countries prior to occupation. In other words, sales concluded outside the direct influence of Nazi 
rule or the so-called ‘Fluchtgut’ cases. Although the reason for such sales may well have been 
persecution – the owner flees the country and therefore needs money to survive – there is no direct 
causal link between the loss and persecution. Under the post-war restitution laws such cases would 
                                                        
67 Marei von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, et. al., Order granting Case 2:07-cv-
02866-JFW, District Court Central District of Cal., August 9, 2016. Litigation initiated in 2007. 
68 Idem, p. 2. 
69 Letters of protest by the Stroganoff family, whose collection was auctioned, was published in the 
New York Herald Tribune of May 13, 1931, at. 15: “The soviet republic has taken possession of this 
collection in a way that sets at defiance every principle of international law”, see Stroganoff-
Sherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18 (SDNY 1976), as reproduced in J.H. Merryman and A. Elsen 
Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, (Kluwer 1998), p. 40-41. 
70 Their provenance as coming from Ukraine is presented (in Ukrainian) on 
http://lostart.org.ua/ua/research/61.htmlin, and earlier was mentioned in N.H. Yeide, K. Akinsha and 
A.M. Walsh the AAM Guide to Provenance Research (American Association of Museums, 2001), p. 135.  
71 See hereunder, fn. 114 and accompanying text. 
72 Arguments in favour: A. Adler Expanding the scope of museums' ethical guidelines with respect to 
Nazi-Looted art: Incorporating restitution claims based on private sales made as a direct result of 
persecution, in International Journal of Cultural Property (2007) 14:57-84. Also R.S. Lauder, president 
of the World Jewish Congress, argued that ‘Fluchtgut’ should be included in Zürich 2 Feb 2016, see: 
http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/remarks-by-ronald-s-lauder-in-zurich-a-crime-
committed-80-years-ago-continues-to-stain-the-world-of-art-today-2-2-2016.  
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not qualify for restitution.73 Such laws were limited in terms of place and time, and possibilities for 
restitution were restricted to losses under Nazi rule.74 However, in present-day practice it is less clear 
how ‘Fluchtgut’ should be classified.75  
 
In fact, the first recommendation of the Beratende Kommission honoured such a claim in the Julius 
Freund case.76 The Commission was not very clear as to the reasons underlying what may be seen as 
an extended application of Law no. 59.77 However, in a later 'Fluchtgut' case concerning the sale in 
London in 1934 by German art dealer Flechtheim the Beratende Kommission explained its position by 
stating that: 
 
"If an art dealer and collector persecuted by the Nazis sold a painting on the regular art 
market or at auction in a safe country abroad, there would have to be very specific reasons 
to recognize such a sale as a loss of property as the result of Nazi persecution. In the case of 
Flechtheim and the painting “Violon et encrier”, no such reasons are apparent. For this 
reason as well, the Advisory Commission cannot recommend the restitution desired by the 
Flechtheim heirs."78  
 
A similar approach to 'Fluchtgut' (a denial) was adopted in a 2012 UK Spoliation Advisory Panel 
(SAP) case regarding fourteen clocks and watches that had been sold by a refugee in London in 
193979 as well as in two Dutch binding opinions regarding sales by a German Jewish businessman in 
the Netherlands in 1933.80 The SAP in its 2012 case considered that, although the sale by a Jewish 
refugee of a collection of clocks and watches in London in 1939 was a 'forced sale' – i.e. the items 
would not have been sold had the Nazis not come to power – this particular sale was: 
 
"at the lower end of any scale of gravity for such sales. It is very different from those cases 
where valuable paintings were sold, for example, in occupied Belgium to pay for food or 
where all assets had to be sold in Germany in the late 1930s to pay extortionate taxes. The 
sale was not compelled by any need to purchase freedom or to sustain the necessities of life. 
                                                        
73 To this author’s knowledge there is no case-law, legislation or literature to support such an extensive 
interpretation. See also Robinson (fn. 43).  
74 Namely, the restitution was limited, in the case of occupied states to the period of occupation (e.g. 
France and the Netherlands), in the case of Germany to the period of Nazi rule (1933-1945), and in neutral 
countries the period starting from the breakout of the War in 1939. 
75 Arguments were made by the President of the World Jewish Congress Ronald Lauder to treat Fluchtgut 
in the same way as looted art. See C. Hickley 'Swiss under pressure over art that Jews were forced to sell', 
Art Newspaper 3 March 2016. 
76 'The First Recommendation of the Advisory Commission' of 12 January 2005, see Press release via 
https://www.kulturgutverluste.de/Webs/EN/AdvisoryCommission/Recommendations/Index.html. 
77 Cf. “The recommendation […] does not […] tell us whether these considerations were or were not 
taken, or should or should not be taken into account. Nor does the recommendation explain why the 
principle of justice laid down in Military Law No. 59 should apply to sales outside Germany in safe 
states.”. M. Weller Key elements of Just and Fair Solutions: The case for a Restatement of Restitution 
Principles, in Campfens (2015), see fn.1, p. 205. 
78 Recommendation of the Beratende Kommission in the matter of the Heirs of Alfred Flechtheim v. 
Stiftung Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf of 21 March 2016 ( < 
https://www.kulturgutverluste.de>). 
79 Report in respect of fourteen clocks and watches now in the possession of the British Museum, London, 7 
March 2012. 
80 Binding opinion in the dispute on restitution of the painting entitled Christ and the Samaritan Woman at 
the Well by Bernardo Strozzi of 25 April, 2013 (RC 3.128) and Binding opinion regarding the dispute about 
the return of the painting Madonna and Child with Wild Roses by Jan van Scorel of 25 April, 2013 (RC 3.131). 
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Furthermore, the sale was arranged by a prominent English auction house with (…) no cause 
to question the seller's reasons for selling."81 
 
Interestingly, the SAP introduces here a 'scale of gravity': restitution or compensation could be 
recommended if the sale was at the ‘high end’ but not at the 'low end'. The SAP dismissed the 
restitution claim but found an alternative solution in ”the display alongside the objects, or any of 
them whenever they are displayed, of their history and provenance during and since the Nazi era.” 82 
In fact, the Dutch Restitutions Committee followed this line of reasoning – i.e. rejecting the claim 
after establishing the sale was involuntary and recommending a display alongside the exhibited 
objects in the museums as a commemoration of its provenance.83  
 
On the notion of the involuntary nature of the sale the committee concludes “the sale of his 
paintings at the auction at Frederik Muller & Cie. in 1933, while at first sight prompted by economic 
factors, cannot be seen separately from Semmel's persecution by the Nazi regime in Germany. The 
Committee therefore concludes that this sale must be considered to have been involuntary."84 
 
In the United States the question whether ‘Fluchtgut’ qualifies as 'unlawful looting' was addressed in 
a ruling by an Ohio court regarding the sale of a painting by Gauguin by Jewish refugee Martha 
Nathan in Switzerland in 1938. The court ruled in favour of the museum and held that:  
 
"In short, this sale occurred outside Germany by and between private individuals who were 
familiar with each other. The painting was not confiscated or looted by the Nazis; the sale 
was not at the direction of, nor did the proceeds benefit, the Nazi regime."85  
 
In a similar US litigated case, regarding a claim by the Nathan heirs to a painting by Van Gogh in the 
Detroit Institute of Arts - sold by Martha Nathan in Switzerland in 1938 as well -, a Michigan court 
also ruled against the claimants.86   
 
                                                        
81 SAP Report 7 March 2012, pp. 19-21, 27. 
82 In the SP Glaser case, concerning an early sale in 1933 in Germany, stemming 'from mixed motives', the 
Panel introduced a similar approach: "we consider that the claimants’ moral claim is insufficiently strong 
to warrant a recommendation that the drawings should be transferred to them. We also consider that, 
whenever any of the drawings is on show, the Courtauld should display alongside it a brief account of its 
history and provenance (..). SAP Report in respect of eight drawings now in the possession of the Samuel 
Courtauld Trust of  24 June 2009, at 34 and 47. 
83 (RC 3.128) as well as (RC 3.131), see fn. 79; in two cases concerning objects from the same Semmel 
collection (RC 3.126) of 2013, and (RC 1.75) of 2009), the artefacts were returned. This is explained by a 
difference in policy lines between cases that concern the Dutch State collection of heirless art and cases 
concerning other collections. In the last category the Committee will balance the interests of the parties, 
which turned out advantageous for the claimant in one of these cases (RC 3.126). In a fourth Semmel 
case (RC 1.127), the painting could not be identified as ever having been pre-war property of Semmel. 
84 Idem, (RC 3.128), (RC 3.131) and (RC 3.126). 
85 Toledo Museum of Art v. Claude George Ullin, et al., No. 3:06 CV 7031, US Dist. (N.D. Ohio, 28 December 
2006), at 7.  Concluding: “Defendants [the Nathan heirs, EC] can prove no set of facts that entitle them to 
relief.” 
86 The claim was barred by the statute of limitations, see Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin, Slip Copy, 2007 
WL 1016996 (E.D. Mich. 2007). For a pending US 'Fluchtgut' case see Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, Index No. 1:16-cv-07665), Complaint, U.S. Dist. (C.D. New York, S. D., 30 September 
2016). 
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On the whole, ‘Fluchtgut’ appear not to be well accepted as ‘Nazi-loot’ by national panels and less so 
by courts. However, the line is not clear. In the view of the present author bringing such sales within 
the notion of ‘looting’ over-stretches that definition. 
 
1.4 Concluding remark on the substantive norm 
 
Inconsistencies in outcomes – as seen in the categories of ‘early sales’, ‘sales by art dealers’ and 
‘Fluchtgut’ sales - illustrate that no clear definition of what is considered ‘Nazi-looting’ within the 
context of the ‘fair and just’ norm exists. In addition to establishing what constitutes a ‘forced sale' – 
and what are the limits of that concept – there are many other difficulties in determining a ‘fair and 
just solution’. How, for example, to deal with the interests of a new possessor, who may have 
acquired the artefact for a considerable sum of money and in good faith (as in the French example in 
the introduction)? And how should earlier compensation and settlements influence the outcome of 
present-day claims? Is it justifiable to take into account the interests of the general public in cases 
involving important works of art in museums, in line of the 'universalist' notion of the cultural 
property debate?87 If so, that would be an argument against return to private ownership. A financial 
settlement, in that view, would be the preferred solution, as in practice is often done. That, then, 
evokes another question if compensation was already awarded in the post-war period: when will a 
case be settled definitely? Further research into existing case law involving circumstances on the list 
given under 2.1 above and clarification of the norm would seem useful in this respect.  
 
Every case is different and from that perspective an open norm (‘fair and just’) and alternative 
procedures with the flexibility to accommodate creative and fact-specific solutions may be needed. 
This requires the availability of neutral and transparent procedures to further develop that norm. At 
the procedural level, though, there appears to be a worrying discrepancy between the present 
'legalistic' approach in countries like the US – for litigating 'big' cases – and the 'soft' ADR model 
based on non-binding ‘moral’ policy instruments in Europe. 
 
 
2. Access to justice 
 
The next part addresses access to justice: possibilities for the assessment of claims on their merits. 
The question discussed here is what neutral institution parties can turn to for clarification of the fair 
and just rule, given its non-binding (soft-law) status and abstract nature and obstacles in positive 
law. The Washington Principles, along with other soft-law instruments, stress the importance of a 
non-legalistic ‘moral’ approach and alternative dispute resolution. In these Principles the 44 
signatory States agreed to “develop national processes (..), particularly as they relate to alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) for resolving ownership issues."88 But what neutral ADR 
procedures are available? Where to turn to for a neutral assessment and interpretation of 
ambiguous facts?  
 
2.1 ADR approach in Europe 
 
In response to the call for ‘fair and just’ solutions and alternative (out-of-court) procedures for 
ownership issues, around the turn of the century a number of European countries set up alternative 
                                                        
87 J.H.M. Merryman "Cultural property internationalism is shorthand for the proposition that everyone 
has an interest in the preservation and enjoyment of cultural property" in Cultural Property 
Internationalism, International Journal of Cultural Property (2005) 12:11-39. This argument is often used 
against restitution of artefacts looted in the past to source countries. 
88 Principle XI of the Washington Principles, see fn. 9. 
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procedures for dealing with Nazi-looted art claims: the Spoliation Advisory Panel in the UK, the 
CIVS89 in France, the Dutch Restitutions Committee in the Netherlands, the Beratende Kommission in 
Germany, and the Beirat in Austria.90 These are government-appointed panels specialised in out-of-
court adjudication or mediation of Holocaust-related art claims. To summarise a few notable 
characteristics of the committees:91 
 
• The Advisory Board of the Commission for Provenance Research in Austria (‘Beirat’), 
established by the Art Restitution Law of 1998,92 decides on the basis of proactive provenance 
research – ex officio – whether a specific loss of possession of a work of art that is now part of a 
federal collection should be considered void, in which case restitution will be recommended. This 
can also apply to items that were originally restituted after the War but subsequently became state 
property in the course of proceedings related to the Austrian export ban. As at November 2017 the 
Austrian Committee had issued 337 opinions.93   
• The main objective of the French CIVS, established in 1999, is compensation for lost items, 
provided they were lost within the territory of France and during the Nazi occupation (i.e. under 
responsibility of the collaborating Vichy regime).94 In practice this can result in a situation whereby a 
claimant has a compensation claim in France for the loss of an item alongside a claim for restitution 
of that same item from a museum in another country. As at June 2017 the CIVS had dealt with 3,259 
cases involving personal property, of which 287 involved works of art.95 In 2014 restitution was 
advised in four of these cases, concerning works belonging to the so-called MNR collection of 
heirless art.96 
• The UK Spoliation Advisory Panel (SAP), which had dealt with 19 cases as at November 
2017, was established in February 2000 in order to provide an alternative process to litigation and 
resolve claims relating to art lost during the Nazi era currently in UK public collections. As stated in 
its terms of reference, the Panel’s function is to achieve a fair and just solution whereby it may take 
into account non-legal obligations such as the moral strength of a claim. 97 Claimants can submit 
claims to the Panel unilaterally; in the case of a joint request by claimant and owner the Panel can 
also consider claims relating to items in a private collection. 
• The Dutch Restitutions Committee, established in 2001, has at November 2017 dealt with 
148 cases regarding 1,556 objects. 98 Most of these objects are part of the Dutch State collection, 
more specifically belonging to the so-called NK collection of ‘heirless art’ - a term used to describe 
art collections left in the custody of a specific government and not returned to their pre-war owners 
in the years after the Second World War. All claims involving works in the State collection that were 
                                                        
89 Commission pour l’indemnisation des victime de spoliations intervenues du fair de legislations 
antisemites en vigueur pendant l’Occupation (CIVS). 
90 For the official names, see above. For an overview of the committees: A. Marck and E. Muller 
‘National Panels advising on Nazi-looted art in Austria, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Germany – a brief overview’, in: Campfens (2015), p. 41-91.  
91 Based on: Campfens (2015), p. 237. 
92 Art Restitution Act, Federal Law GazetteNo. 181/1998 
www.provenienzforschung.gv.at/empfehlungen-des-beirats/gesetze/kunstruckgabegesetze. 
93 http://www.provenienzforschung.gv.at/empfehlungen-des-beirats/beschluesse/beschluesse-
alphabetish/?lang=en. 
94 Marck and Muller (2015), p. 59. 
95 See http://www.civs.gouv.fr/images/pdf/thecivs/key_figures_june_2017.pdf. 
96 MNR stands for: ‘Musees Nationaux Recuperation’. 
97 Terms of reference of the Spoliation Panel https://www.gov.uk/governments/groups/spoliation-
advisory-panel. 
98 www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/two_tasks.html. Information on the numbers provided for by the 
Restitutions Committee on 6 November 2017. 
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lost as a result of the Nazi regime are referred to the Restitutions Committee as a matter of general 
policy, while other parties can voluntarily submit a case. The Committee’s task is to find a 'fair and 
reasonable' solution for these cases. The Dutch Museums Association has advised its members to 
refer claims involving works of art which cannot be settled amicably to the Committee. 
• Germany’s Advisory Commission on the return of cultural property seized as a result of Nazi 
persecution (‘Beratende Kommission’), installed in 2003, mediates in disputes between public 
institutions and former owners or their heirs. A request for advice can be laid before the committee 
provided that at least one party is a public institution and all the parties involved approve. Through 
its advice, the Beratende Kommission seeks to find a fair and just solution in accordance with the 
Washington Principles and policy lines as laid down in the so-called Gemeinsame Erklärung. As at 
November 2017 the Kommission had issued 15 recommendations.99  
 
In establishing these panels and their working methods the focus is on national issues like in France 
and the Netherlands the presence of ‘heirless art’ collections.100 Given the obligations of 
governments under post-war agreements to return confiscated art to the individual owners (see 
above), such cases are essentially different from those involving artefacts that over time and 
perhaps after many transfers have ended up in possession of third parties, public or private.  
 
The number of cases dealt with by the different committees varies, as do their working methods and 
their mandate. An important observation to make here – as Charlotte Woodhead points out on the 
situation in the UK – is that "in reality the Spoliation Panel's jurisdiction is the only formal dispute 
resolution rather than an alternative method".101 The same applies in most other countries. For 
disputes regarding objects which do not fall within the mandate of these panels, it would appear 
that often no institutionalised neutral claims procedure is available. The Gurlitt case in Germany 
serves as an example of how problems are not limited to public collections, as well illustrating the 
complex legal status of looted art and the political minefield it can create for governments.102 
 
2.2 Access to justice through courts of law 
 
Parties looking for fair and just solutions to their disputes through regular courts may find 
themselves in a legal labyrinth – or vacuum, depending on your perspective. A common 
denominator in Nazi-looted art cases is that relevant facts are spread out over a period of some 70-
80 years and involve multiple jurisdictions. Property law, on the other hand, differs from country to 
country (and in the US from state to state), and from period to period. In common law countries – 
like the UK and US – the position of the dispossessed owner is relatively strong based on the 
underlying principle that a thief cannot convey good title (the nemo dat rule).103 In countries with a 
civil law tradition – including countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany – the position 
of the present possessor is stronger: a good-faith acquisition or even just the passage of time 
(adverse possession) may convey to a new possessor a perfectly valid legal title over artefacts that 
                                                        
99 www.kulturgutverluste.de/Webs/EN/AdvisoryCommission/Recommendations/Index.html. 
100 For the Netherlands: the so-called ‘NK-collection’, in France the MNR. 
101 C. Woodhead 'Nazi Era Spoliation: Establishing Procedural and Substantive Approaches' in: Art Antiquity 
and Law, Vo. XVIII, Issue 2, July 2013. 
102 Related in C. Hickley The Munich Art Hoard: Hitler’s dealer and his secrets (2015, Thames and 
Hudson).  
103 In the words of an American judge: “Throughout the course of human history, the perpetration of 
evil has inevitably resulted in the suffering of the innocent, and those who act in good faith. And the 
principle has been basic in the law that a thief conveys no title as against the true owner” (Silsbury v. 
McCoon, 3 N.Y. 379, 383–384 (1850); II Kent Comm. 14th ed., per Holmes, 324–325), cited in Menzel 
v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966). 
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were stolen.104 All jurisdictions, however, have in common that possibilities for a court to assess a 
claim on its merits are subject to time limits (which vary between jurisdictions).105 On a certain 
moment, the law adjusts itself to reality for the sake of legal certainty, the moment it does varies 
however widely.  As explained above, while after the War special restitution laws were enacted in 
Europe in many cases these laws lost their effect today as a result of limitation periods.106  
 
The international community acknowledged this fragmented situation and the need to ensure 
better protection for cultural objects in the future. As a result several international conventions have 
addressed the unlawful transfer of cultural objects and their return to countries of origin or former 
owners since 1954.107 These conventions must be implemented in national law and – more 
importantly in the present context – do not have retroactive effect. Thus, they do not apply to Nazi 
looting.  
 
Several of the international declarations on the subject of Nazi-looted art, signed by the 
international community as a follow-up of the 1998 Washington Principles, include 
recommendations to proceed with legislative reforms.108 These recommendations, however, are 
characterized by vague and non-committal wording. In the 2009 Terezin Declaration, for example, it 
was declared that “Governments should consider all relevant issues when applying various legal 
provisions that may impede the restitution of art and cultural property, in order to achieve just and 
fair solutions, as well as alternative dispute resolution, where appropriate under the law.”109 
 
                                                        
104 For opposite outcomes in similar cases on Second World War looting (non-Holocaust related) the Dutch 
Land Sachsen ruling denying the claim on a painting looted from Dresden applying the absolute limitation 
period from the moment of the loss (ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZC2644, Hoge Raad, 8 May 1998), versus UK and US 
cases that were honoured: (UK) City of Gotha e.a. v. Sotheby's and Cobert Finance SA, UK High Court of 9 
September 1998; (US): Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). For a German 
denial of a claim regarding Nazi-loss on the basis of the thirty years’ absolute limitation period, see this 2016 
ruling on a Pechstein painting: Landesgericht Frankfurt am Main, Urt. V. 02.11.2016, Az.: 2-21 O 251/15. See on 
the clash between legal approaches also e.g. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F.Supp.2d 298, at 302-304 
(D.D.C. 2005); in this case Dutch law vs. US (NY) law. 
105 Time limitation may start to run from the moment of the loss of property, or from the moment of 
discovery of the object (or when one would reasonably have been able to discover it); or - as under 
New York - from the moment of ‘demand and refusal’.  
See Schönenberger (2009) and A. Chechi, The Settlement of International Cultural Heritage 
Disputes (OUP, 2014), p. 89.  
106 NB In France and Germany courts held claims admissible, either on grounds of a ‘void’ transaction 
(France) on on grounds that it had been impossible for claimants to meet deadlines set in restitution 
laws. In these cases – concerning clear confiscations - the artefacts had to be returned. See the 
German Hans Sachs Postercollection case (Bundesgerichtshof V ZR 279/10, 16 March 2012); in 
France: the 2017 Bauer case (fn. 1) and the Gentili di Giuseppe case (C. Gentili di Giuseppe e.a. v. 
Musee du Louvre, Cour d’Appel, 1st Division, Section A, 2 June 1999). 
107 UNESCO [Hague] Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
and its First Protocol, signed The Hague, May, 1954; UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 
Paris, 14 November 1970; the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
Art. 5.2 (2), June 24, 1995. 
108 The 1999 Council of Europe resolution being most firm in recommending (13): “It may be 
necessary to facilitate restitution by providing for legislative change with particular regard being 
paid to: (i) Extending or removing statutory limitation periods; (ii) removing restrictions on 
inalienability […] (iv) Waiving export controls. Supra, fn. 16. 
109 Supra, f.n.17. 
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Attempts at EU and UNESCO level to harmonise rules or developing methods to solve disputes 
regarding Nazi-looted artefacts have so far remained unsuccessful.  
 
The 2009 UNESCO Draft Declaration of Principles Relating to Cultural Objects Displaced in 
Connection with the Second World War, which relied on a restitution model based on 
intergovernmental return as in the post-war Inter-Allied model (see above), was never adopted. The 
main reason for that seems conflicting views on the issue of ‘restitution in kind’ – i.e. on the legality 
of keeping the artefacts taken earlier from the territory of Germany by the Red Army as War 
reparations.110 With regard to an interstate system of returns and its (in)efficiency today with regard 
to ensuring rights of individual former owners, a consideration to keep in mind is that families that 
owned these works often are not nationals of the country where the looting took place.  
 
At European Union level a resolution was adopted by the European Parliament in 2003 on artefacts 
looted during Second World War.111 In the resolution, that was never followed up, the EP stresses 
the lack of legal certainty, transparency and coherent approach and calls upon the European 
Commission to launch an investigation into the development of a “transparent remedial structure” 
for disputes. The resolution emphasises that these measures “should not only contribute to a more 
consistent and predictable internal market in art works, they should also improve access to justice 
and respect the rule of law”. Since 2014 the European Parliament has taken on the subject again:112 
it has been working on a resolution calling for legislation on the subject of provenance research and 
the creation of central databases that would document (past) ownership information, to enhance 
due diligence in the art trade. Whether such legislation can provide a solution for dispute resolution 
of restitution claims – while the objective seems to facilitate such claims by making information 
more accessible – seems uncertain. 
 
2.3 The US approach 
 
In general, legal claims to Nazi-looted art pose major challenges to former owners and, more often 
than not, will not be supported by the law. The US legal system forms an exception. Claimants have 
more success in litigating Nazi-looted art cases and courts are more willing to exercise jurisdiction 
– at least in cases where the loss was clearly the result of confiscation and in as far as it concerns 
courts in California and New York. In this sense, in 1966 a claim by Erna Menzel, a Jewish art 
collector, to a Chagall painting found in possession of Alfred List was honored by the New York 
Supreme Court.113 The painting had been confiscated from Menzel in 1941 in Brussels and she had 
been looking for it ever since: 
“The court has found that (…) it was pillaged and plundered by the Nazis. No title could have 
been conveyed by them as against the rightful owners. The law stands as a bulwark against 
the handiwork of evil, to guard to rightful owners the fruits of their labors.” 
 
The Act of State Doctrine would normally require a court to refrain from examining the validity of 
acts by foreign governments (like seizures or post-war restitution decisions), and is for example a 
                                                        
110 UNESCO, ‘Draft Declaration of Principles Relating to Cultural Objects Displaced in Connection 
with the Second World War’ (31 July 2009) 35 C/24. Annex IV to the Draft Declaration (n. 81). See 
also Campfens (2015), p. 35-36.  
111 Willy CEH De Clercq, ‘Report on a legal framework for free movement within the internal market 
of goods whose ownership is likely to be contested’ (European Parliament – A5-0408/2003). 
112 Procedure file 2017/2023 (INL) < 
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2017/2023(INL)#basic
Information>.  
113 Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966). 
Draft AAL (Dec. 2017), vs. 19 November 2017 
 21 
reason for courts - in the US and elsewhere - to dismiss claims regarding artefacts confiscated and 
nationalised in the 1920s by the Soviet authorities.114 In the case of Holocaust takings, however, this 
doctrine does not apply in the US as the US never recognised the Third Reich as a sovereign state.115 
As a side note – interesting in connection with the discussion of the interests of good faith new 
possessors – in the Menzel v. List case List was awarded in a third party action damages amounting 
to the value of the painting, payable by the art dealer who had sold him the Chagall (i.e. redress 
‘upstream’).116  
 
Following the Altmann litigation (2001-2004) US courts are also able to hear Nazi-looted art cases 
concerning artefacts not physically in the US, even where post-war acts by recognised states are 
involved (for example post-war restitution decisions).117 The Altmann litigation dealt with six 
paintings by Gustav Klimt, amongst them the famous “Lady in Gold”, that had belonged to the 
Jewish Bloch-Bauer family and were confiscated during the Nazi era in Vienna. They had come into 
the possession of the Austrian National Gallery, which refused to return them after the War. The 
case is considered seminal because it opened the doors of the US courts to claimants of Nazi-looted 
art seeking redress against foreign nations or institutions (read: national museums), in spite of the 
rule stating that foreign states and their acts are normally exempt from jurisdiction in another state. 
The implication of the Supreme Court’s 2004 ruling is that, in spite of such immunity as provided for 
in the US by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), Holocaust confiscations fall under an 
exception.118 This exception “abrogates sovereign immunity in any case where rights in property 
taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property is owned or operated by an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a 
commercial activity in the United States.” 119 As to this last condition of ‘commercial activity’, the 
Altmann case made clear that availability of a museum catalogue in the US is sufficient. Such a low 
threshold illustrates US courts’ readiness to take jurisdiction over Holocaust-related cases.120 Also 
interesting in this regard is the rejection by the Californian District Court in 2001 of the plea by 
Austria that the matter should have been litigated in Austria (the US being a forum non conveniens): 
 
“Plantiff’s claims, if asserted in Austria, will most likely be barred by the statute of 
limitations of thirty years. (…) If Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, she 
                                                        
114 E.g. Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, No. 74 Civ. 626, 74 Civ. 5750, US Dist, S.D. New York, 18 May 
1976. The Soviet government was recognized by the US in 1933. A recent case concerning Bolshevik 
takings: Konowaloff v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 11-4338 (2d Cir. 2012). 
115 See (Menzel v. List) fn.113. 
116 The value of the painting at the time of trial, awarded on the basis of a breach of implied 
warranty: Menzel v. List v. Perls, No. 24 N.Y. 2d 91, NY Ct. of Appeals, 26 February 1969. Similarly, in 
the case Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum v. Knoedler-Modarco the Knoedler gallery in the US was 
held liable to compensate the museum for its loss of a Matisse painting (l’Odalisque) after restitution 
to the heirs of Rosenberg, who lost the Matisse painting by confiscation in Paris (Jewish) in 1941. 
See: https://phone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affairede. 
117 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. 677 (4/6/2004). 
118 It was a ‘Statutary Holding’ allowing retro-active application of the exceptions in the FSIA to 
foreign States’ immunity from suit and by doing so, allowing for US courts to take on jurisdiction. 
Parties then agreed on international arbitration.  
119 As cited in David L. de Csepel, et al., v. Republic of Hungary, et al., No. 10-1261 (ESH), Memorandum 
Opinion, U.S. Dist. (C.D. Columbia, 14 March 2016), at p. 28. 
120 Schönenberger (2009), p. 213, in fn. 1102 cites from a write-up by G. Cohen for the book of M.J. Bazyler, 
(Holocaust Justice, New York/London, 2003) “The author (…) posits that the ‘real hero’ is the American justice 
system, the only forum in the world where Holocaust claims can be heard today”. 
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would be left without a remedy; clearly, therefore, Austria is not an adequate alternative 
forum for Plaintiff’s claims.”121 
 
This trend of US courts being willing to hear Holocaust-related art claims is expected to get another 
boost with the adoption of two bills in 2016 and a recent verdict: 
 
-  The so-called HEAR Act, 122 which establishes for claims to Nazi-confiscated art a federal 
(uniform) limitation period of six years after the actual discovery of the object, basically eliminating 
so-called 'technical defences' and allowing claims to be considered on their merits. The rationale is 
stated as follows: "[..] the enactment of a Federal law is necessary to ensure that claims to Nazi-
confiscated art are adjudicated in accordance with United States policy as expressed in the 
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and 
the Terezin Declaration.” The extension of limitation periods is found in Section 5, (a): “This bill will 
allow civil claims or causes of action for the recovery of artwork or certain other property lost 
between January 1, 1933, and December 31, 1945, because of Nazi persecution to be commenced 
within six years after the claimant's actual discovery [...etc. giving further possibilities].” It provides 
for a 'sunset' clause in 2029;  
- The Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act,123 initially aimed at 
providing greater security for foreign museums sending their works on loan to the US, however with 
two notable exceptions: the first being "Nazi-era claims" and the second artefacts "taken in 
connection with the acts of a foreign government as part of a systematic campaign of coercive 
confiscation or misappropriation of works from members of a targeted and vulnerable group.” Thus, 
artefacts (owned by foreign states) on loan in the US subject to claims based on such circumstances, 
are not barred from litigation in US courts.  
- A 2016 ruling in the case Simon v. Republic of Hungary. Whilst not dealing with artefacts the 
ruling is relevant since the court argued that confiscation of private property can, in itself, constitute 
genocide.124 Leaving aside the matter of whether this interpretation of the term ‘genocide’ is 
consistent with the generally accepted notion of genocide,125 it is another sign that US courts are 
willing to adjudicate cases involving Holocaust losses (in this case confiscations by the Hungarian 
Wartime authorities). 
 
2.4 US jurisdiction over European cases 
 
Possibilities for claimants to litigate Holocaust-related art claims in the US exist and are widening. 
This would seem a positive development in terms of ensuring access to justice and will facilitate 
further clarification of restitution principles by US courts. However, from the European perspective, 
it may have undesirable consequences. One aspect of this trend is that cases that could be described 
                                                        
121 Maria V. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, et al., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (CD Cal. 2001), 1209. 
122 S.2763 - Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 114th Congress, 2nd session, 4/1/2016 (2015-
2016). See also N.M. O’Donnell ‘The Holocaust Expropriation Art Recovery Act, a Sea Change in US Law of 
Restitution’, AAL XXII 3 (October 2017), p. 273-279. 
123 H.R.6477 - Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, 114th Congress (2015-2016). 
124 Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 2016, No. 14-7082, (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 2016): “Such takings, did more than 
effectuate genocide or serve as a means of carrying out genocide. Rather, we see the expropriations as 
themselves genocide." This notion was confirmed in the Herzog verdict two months later: De Csepel et al v. 
Republic of Hungary, 2016, see fn. 119. 
125 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (GA Res. 260 A (III) of 9 
December 1948); www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx. 
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as 'typically European’ – as they concern European collections and European parties – are being 
assessed by US courts.126 A schematic overview follows. 
 
2.4.1 Earlier examples  
 
Earlier examples of such forum shopping are: 
- The Altmann case, discussed in the previous paragraph127, concerning six Klimt paintings 
that had been seized and not returned by Austria to the heirs of the former owner, part of Austrian 
museums. After in 2004 the US Supreme Court ruled in favour of the claimants – allowing 
jurisdiction by US courts - the case was settled by an arbitral award in 2006 holding that most of the 
claimed Klimt paintings should be returned to Altmann;128  
- Litigation regarding Egon Schiele’s “Portrait of Wally” in the collection in the Leopold 
Museum in Vienna that lasted from 1998-2010.129 Litigation eventually ended after parties agreed to 
settle their dispute, including payment of 19 million dollars to the heirs of the former owners.130 
- Litigation about a collection of Malevicz paintings of the Amsterdam Stedelijk Museum that 
had been sent on short-term loan in the US (Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam).131 Although in the 
Malevicz case Nazi-confiscation was not an issue, the loss occurred within the context of the Nazi-
period (the ‘degenerate’ paintings had to be hidden after Malevicz had left them in Berlin) and, 
similar to Klee case mentioned in the introduction,132 the owners had been persecuted in the Soviet 
Union which was the reason why they could not have claimed them earlier. The Malevicz case was 
settled between the heirs of Malevicz and the City of Amsterdam after a for the heirs favourable 
outcome. The 2005 and 2007 district court rulings enabled jurisdiction by US courts even though 
immunity for seizure arrangements had been in place (immunity from seizure does not mean 
immunity from suit).133 
 
2.4.2 Examples of ongoing US litigation about ‘European’ cases 
 
- 2005: Pissarro in Madrid134 
Litigation regarding the painting “Street Scene” by Pissarro that is held by the Thyssen-Bornemisza 
Museum in Spain has been ongoing since 2005. The painting had been part of the collection of the 
(Jewish) Cassirer family and was sold in Germany in 1939 and was bought by Baron Thyssen-
                                                        
126 See on the expected favourable consequences of this act for claimants: NYT 27 February, 2017 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/arts/design/a-suit-over-schiele-drawings-invokes-new-law-on-nazi-
looted-art-html>; O’Donnell (2017). 
127 See fn. 121 and accompanying text. 
128 Republic of Austria et al. v. Maria V. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (U.S. 2004). An overview in ArThemis database 
Https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affaires/6-klimt-paintings-2013-maria-altmann-and 
austria/CaseNoteSixKlimtpaintingsMariaAltmannandAustria.pdf/view. 
129 United States v. Portrait of Wally, a Painting by Egon Schiele, No. 99 Civ. 9940 LAP, Southern District of New 
York.  
130 Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance (United States v. Portrait of Wally, a Painting by 
Egon Schiele, No. 99 Civ. 9940 LAP, Southern District of New York). 
131 Supra, fn. 3.  
132 Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D.D.C. 2007) and Malewicz v. City of 
Amsterdam, 362 F.Supp. 2d 298 (D.D.C. 2005): foreign states lending art to the United States are not 
per se immune from jurisdiction under the FSIA, even if the loaned objects were precluded from 
seizure under the Immunity From Seizure Act (IFSA). 
133 This case was reason for the IFSA to be amended, see fn. 123. See the case note on Arthemis: 
https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affaires/14-paintings-2013-malewicz-heirs-and-city-of-
amsterdam. 
134 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, Case No. CV 05-3459-JFW-E (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2015) 
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Bornemisza at a New York gallery in 1976. The latest verdict of June 2015, rendered under Spanish 
law, found in favour of the Spanish museum. Interestingly, in the conclusion the judge urged the 
museum to "pause, reflect and consider whether it would be appropriate to work towards a mutually 
agreeable resolution of this action, in light of Spain's acceptance of the Washington Conference 
Principles and the Terezin Declaration, and, specifically, its commitment to achieve 'just and fair 
solutions' for victims of Nazi persecution." In other words, Spanish law was not considered to be just 
and fair.  
 
- 2010: Herzog collection in Hungary135 
In 2010 the Hungarian State and several Hungarian institutions were sued over the ownership of 
forty-four artefacts – including paintings by El Greco, Velázquez, Van Dyck, Courbet and Corot 
– once owned by Baron Herzog, a Jewish-Hungarian art collector and confiscated in Hungary during 
the Nazi period. The ruling of March 2016 confirms that confiscations during the Holocaust violate 
international law and, moreover, along with the view as developed in the Simon case some months 
before136 that such confiscations can constitute genocide per se and therefore fall under the 
jurisdiction of US courts regardless of the nationality of the aggressor or the victim. 
 
-  2014: The Guelph Treasure in Berlin137 
After the denial in 2014 by the German Beratende Kommission of the claim regarding the 
“Welfenschatz” (“Guelph Treasure”)138 – a hoard of medieval treasures originating from Brunswick 
Cathedral in Germany – the Berlin Museum Foundation (SPK) and German Government were sued 
in Washington. The suit was filed on behalf of family members of the two art dealers who acquired 
the objects from the Duke of Brunswick in 1929 and sold most of the objects to the Dresdner Bank 
on 14 June 1935. On 31 March 2017 the US District Court ruled in favour of US jurisdiction, under 
referral to the brand-new HEAR Act: “Congress specifically recognized and did not foreclose the use 
of litigation as a means to resolve claims to recover Nazi-confiscated art”.139 
 
- 2015: Schiele in possession of London art dealer Nagy140 
An example of litigation concerning non-museum property concerns proceedings initiated against 
London-based art gallery Richard Nagy regarding an Egon Schiele work.  The work once belonged to 
Fritz Grünbaum, a Viennese performer persecuted and murdered in Dachau concentration camp 
who owned an art collection containing eighty-one works by Egon Schiele. Nagy has one of these 
works in his possession. An earlier ruling of 2012 regarding a work from the same collection now in 
possession of a US art dealer dismissed the claim on the grounds of laches (essentially: the heirs had 
waited too long to seek the work’s return).141 The circumstances of the loss are unclear, it is argued 
that the works were not looted but validly sold after the War by Grünbaum's sister-in-law. Then 
                                                        
135 David L. de Csepel, et al., v. Republic of Hungary, et al., No. 10-1261 (ESH), Memorandum Opinion, U.S. Dist. 
(C.D. Columbia, 14 March 2016) 
136 See fn. 124. 
137 Philipp et al. v. Federal Republic of Germany et al. No. 1:15-CV-00266, Complaint, U.S. Dist. (C.D. Columbia, 
23 February 2015) 
138 Above, fn. 63 and section 1.3.1.2. 
139 See O’Donnell (2017), p. 277; Philipp et al. v. Federal Republic of Germany, see fn. 137,, Ruling 
D.D.C. 31 March 2017.  
140 Timothy Reif and David Fraenkel, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Leon Fischer and Milos Vavra v. Richard 
Nagy, No. 161799/2015, Summons, Supreme Court of New York (New York County, 16 November 2015); NB 
Nagy had sent the specific work to a US fair - so in this aspect the Nagy case stands out from the others 
mentioned above. 
141 Bakalar v. Vavra 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) and 500 Fed. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2012) 
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again, a third work of the Grünbaum collection was subject to a settlement agreement awarding a 
certain sum of money to the heirs when it was put up for auction at Christie's.142 
 
- September 2016: damages for loss of 306 paintings143  
In Toren v. Federal Republic of Germany the heir of David Friedmann, David Toren, seeks the return 
or the present value of 306 works of art from the German State as redress “for the genocidal 
expropriation of property". Allegedly, these works are listed in archival records of the seizure of 
Friedman’s art collection during the Nazi era but their location is (as yet) unknown.144 In May 2015 
one painting on the list, “Riders on the Beach” by Max Liebermann which was located in the Gurlitt 
collection, was returned to Toren.145 
 
- September 2016: Matisse in London146  
This dispute concerns “Portrait of Greta Moll“ by Matisse in the National Gallery, which according to 
the complaint was sent to Switzerland in the post-war period by the Jewish owner "in order to 
protect the painting from the danger of looting by Allied troops and in particular from Russian 
troops."147 Seemingly no Holocaust loss is at issue in this case, and the claim was dismissed in 
September 2017 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and because the claimants “did not diligently 
pursue their rights to the Painting given that they knew as of the late 1970s or early 1980s that the 
National Gallery owned the Painting, which they believed had been stolen from Greta Moll.”148 
 
- December 2016: Beckmann, Klee and Gris in Munich149 
In December 2016 the Bavarian Staatsgemäldesammlungen and the Bavarian State were sued in a 
New York court by the heirs of art dealer Flechtheim, a Jewish Berlin dealer in modern art, over 
eight paintings by Beckmann, Klee and Gris in a Munich museum. As seen above in section 1.3.1.2, 
previously two Flechtheim cases had been considered by the German Beratende Kommission. The 
first claim was honoured, while the later one – concerning ‘Fluchtgut’, namely a sale in London in 
1934 - was dismissed.150 In the case pending before the New York District Court, the Museum argues 
the works were sold before Hitler came to power.  
 
                                                        
142 XX 
143 Toren v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 1:16-cv-01885, District of Columbia Dist.  
144 J.V. Staff in 'Jewish Voice', 28/9/2016 and N. O'Donnell's Art Law Report of September 29, 2016. 
145 The heirs of the late Cornelius Gurlitt - who inherited nearly 1,500 works of art from his father Hildebrand, 
an art dealer of the Nazi era - endorsed the return after recommendation of the Gurlitt Task Force. Toren had 
filed suit in the US for the Liebermann in 2014 in David Toren v Federal Republic of Germany and Free State of 
Bavaria, No. 14-cv-00359-ABJ, D.D.C., March 5, 2014; See also: N. O'Donnell, Art Law Report May 13, 2015. 
146 Green et al v. The National Gallery of Art, London, The American Friends of the National Gallery of Art, 
London, and Great Britain, No. 1:16-CV-06978, U.S. Dist. (New York, S.D.). 
147 Ibid., complaint 6 September 2016. 
148 Ibid, Memorandum Opinon & Order of 21 September 2017: “(T) there has been no taking in violation of 
international law as required by FSIA, and the Court does not have jurisdiction over the National Gallery and 
Great Britain pursuant to FSIA’s expropriation exception”(p.12)  
149 Michael R. Hulton and Penny R. Hulton v. Bayerische Gemäldesammlungen, No. 16-CV-9360, U.S. NYSD, 
Complaint 5 December 2016. 
150 Recommendation of the Advisory Commission on the return of cultural property seized as a result of 
Nazi persecution, of 9 April 2013; Recommendation of the Beratende Kommission in the matter of 
the Heirs of Alfred Flechtheim v. Stiftung Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf, of 21 
March 2016. Supra, fn. 61 and 62. 
150 Recommendation of 20 March 2014 of the Beratende Kommission regarding the 'Welfenschatz', 
see < https://www.kulturgutverluste.de>; See footnote 63 
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- March 2017: Kandinsky in Munich151 
In March 2017 litigation was initiated in New York over Kandinsky's “Das Bunte Leben” in the Munich 
Lenbachhaus museum, owned by a German bank, on allegations the work was confiscated from the 
Dutch Lewenstein family during the German occupation. The claim seeks damages at least equal to 
the estimated value of the painting, stated in the complaint as $ 80,000,000.'152 
 
2.5 Concluding remark on access to justice 
 
The current legal framework is of an amazing diversity as to the possibilities and impossibilities in 
terms of getting claims resolved on their merits by a neutral forum. There  is a discrepancy between 
the approach and possibilities in the US and Europe. In the US, where the interests of original 
owners of stolen artworks are traditionally taken more into consideration, courts are willing to take 
jurisdiction over works that were confiscated by the Nazis, also in cases that concern works in 
Europe or are under an immunity for seizure arrangement on loan in the US. This will intensify with 
the adoption of the HEAR Act. 
 
This does not mean however that the ADR model has been abandoned in the US, given the 
following statement in the aforementioned HEAR Act: 
 
"While litigation may be used to resolve claims to recover Nazi-confiscated art, it is the sense of 
Congress that the private resolution of claims by parties involved, on the merits and through the use of 
alternative dispute resolution such as mediation panels established for this purpose with the aid of 
experts in provenance research and history, will yield just and fair resolutions in a more efficient and 
predictable manner." 153 
 
The rationale appears to be that parties should attempt, seriously and in good faith, to solve their 
dispute by means of ADR before resorting to litigation in the US. In arguing for example that a US 
court is not the correct forum to litigate a claim concerning artefacts in European museums before 
local remedies have been exhausted – the ‘forum non conveniens’ argument – it would be important 
to have an efficient and authoritative ADR procedure in place.154 In other words: the installation of a 
European ADR committee with certain guarantees as to due process might reduce the need to take 
cases overseas. 
 
In Europe, however, the present situation is highly fragmented. In some European States the 
Washington Principles seem not implemented at all.155 In other countries, neutral adjudication on 
the merits of cases is left to the respective national panels. Cases beyond that mandate tend to be 
settled – provided parties are willing –; the ‘moral’ approach. Such settlements will obviously 
                                                        
151 Robert C. Lewenstein, Francesca M. Davis and E. Hannchen Guidotti v. Bayerische Landesbank, No. 17-cv-
0160, U.S. NYSD, Complaint 3 March 2017; a Guardian report on the issue: 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/mar/03/banks-kandinsky-painting-looted-nazis-family-
colourful-life. 
152 Ibid., Complaint page 22. 
153 Section 8, HEAR Act, see fn. 122. 
154 “The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a 
well-established rule of customary international law; […] Before resort may be had to an international court in 
such a situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an 
opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system. 
‘Interhandel case’ (Switzerland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 26-27. 
155 See, e.g. W.A. Fisher and R. Weinberger “Holocaust-Era Looted Art: A Current World-Wide 
Overview”, Claims Conference (2014) http://art-69bd.kxcdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Worldwide-Overview.pdf. 
Draft AAL (Dec. 2017), vs. 19 November 2017 
 27 
depend on the bargaining chips brought to the table.156 One such bargaining chips is the possibility 
of taking a case to the US for costly and lengthy litigation.  
 
 
3. Conclusions and final observations 
 
The observations above are based on ongoing research and are intended to incite further discussion. 
Many issues that also deserve attention are not included.  
 
While Nazi looting is a moral issue the thesis underlying this article is that a legal approach to 
dispute settlement is needed. The role of law should be to set clear, consistent and transparent 
standards to ensure that equal cases can be treated equally and outcomes are fair and just. To 
summarise: 
1) The soft-law norm of finding 'fair and just solutions' for Nazi-looted art is open to many 
different interpretations. Some believe looted objects should always be returned to their former 
owners – ‘once stolen, always stolen’ – while others believe ‘fair and just’ means that the various 
interests should be weighed. The first section of this paper seeks to highlight the lack of clarity 
surrounding the ‘fair and just’ norm. The thesis is put forward that the rule is based on two elements. 
First, the intangible heritage quality of artefacts and their ability to act as a symbol for lost family 
histories is reason for a special (favourable) treatment: these cases are not merely about ownership 
rights. Furthermore, the fair and just rule is meant for involuntary losses – a confiscation, theft or 
sale under duress. A sale under duress is a sale where there is a direct link between the persecution 
of the owner and the loss of the object. If that link cannot be established, the ‘fair and just’ rule does 
not apply. 
2) Access to justice is limited. The Washington Principles, along with other soft-law 
instruments, stress the importance of a non-legalistic ‘moral’ approach and alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) for resolving ownership issues. And indeed, parties searching for 'fair and just' 
solutions on the merits of a case need alternative procedures as most legal systems do not support 
claims regarding losses that took place so many years ago. Increased possibilities to litigate 
(Holocaust-related) cases in the US, however, raise the question of how this trend will reflect on the 
European situation. This article proposes that the (institutional) vacuum in terms of access to justice 
be addressed. A lack of clarity at both the substantive and the procedural level – what is the norm 
and who will clarify it – may otherwise result in legal insecurity, inconsistent outcomes and, 
potentially, injustice. Or, as the European Parliament put it in 2003:  
 
“.. the current situation lacks legal certainty, transparency and a coherent approach. This is a cross-
border issue calling for a cross-border solution.”157 
 
To fill the institutional ‘vacuum’ in jurisdictions where no neutral forum is in place which can apply 
soft-law norms that reflect present-day morality, the establishment of an international claims 
procedure could be considered. Such establishment would also meet the obligation that states have 
assumed – by signing soft-law instruments like the Washington Principles and the Terezin 
Declaration – to develop mechanisms to ensure that the ‘fair and just’ norm is upheld. The late 
Professor Norman Palmer voiced this idea in 2014 as follows: 
 
“…the formation of a body that can offer a variety of services, to which nations and individuals 
might refer claims. Either on an ad hoc basis or on the basis of a formal agreement. (It) might offer a 
                                                        
156 F. Shyllon ‘The Rise of Negotiation (ADR) in Restitution, Return and Repatriation of Cultural 
Property: Moral Pressure and Power Pressure’ (2017) XXII Art Antiquity and Law 130-142. 
157 See f.n.111  
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variety of approaches to claims: arbitration, mediation and conciliation, expert neutral appraisal, 
binding expert opinion, or the straightforward process of recommendation and moral assessment 
that lies at the heart of the English regime in this field.”158  
 
It is a separate matter where such an organisation would fit in – UNESCO, ICOM, the European 
Union or the Council of Europe – or rather should be a standalone. It also exceeds the limits of this 
paper to delve into the question of whether such a process should be voluntary or semi-obligatory – 
for example by incorporating in the general terms of art fairs and auction houses the requirement 
that certain disputes be referred to the body in question, or including a declaration of intent in the 
codes of conduct of museums and art dealer associations. The paramount issue would seem to be 
the neutrality and transparency of such an organisation, and the authority of its working methods 
and solutions found. With regard to the idea of such a specialized ADR body, a practical argument in 
conclusion. Recognition of the rights of victims of the Holocaust to their lost cultural objects has 
triggered wider awareness and discussion on the legality of looting of cultural objects - in the past 
and present - and on the rights of former owners (individuals or groups, like indigenous peoples).159 
A pro-active (and international) approach might help to structure this field. Whilst the historical 
background of the actual looting may be specific to a certain place, the effects of that looting can be 
felt in any country with an art market, art collectors or museums.  
 
                                                        
158 See, fn.14. The thought builds on the 2003 Resolution of the European Parliament (section 2.2, fn. 111 ) 
and was supported by a recent study by M.A. Renold and ArThemis (2016), see: < 
http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f600d443-20a9-11e6-86d0-01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1 
>. 
159 An illustration of public awareness in other areas: ‘Dispossessions of Cultural Objects between 1914 
and 1989/1991’ is the subject of a conference organized by the Slovenian France Stele Institute of Art 
History in March 2018.  
